CVE
CVE-2026-123272, CVE-2026-123271, CVE-2026-113663, CVE-2026-61536, CVE-2026-122133, CVE-2026-122134, CVE-2026-122135, CVE-2026-44209
CWE
CWE-400, CWE-444, CWE-416, CWE-125, CWE-287, CWE-78, CWE-94, CWE-22
Affected Surface
- crates.io `actix-http` `< 3.20.3` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0446`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0448`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0455`), `actix-web` `< 4.18.2` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0447`), and `actix-files` `< 0.7.4` on Windows (`RUSTSEC-2026-0443`)
- crates.io `surrealdb` `< 3.3.0` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0453` / `GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463`), `surrealdb-core` `< 4.0.0` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0454` / `GHSA-m9qr-4rcq-3jhc`), and `surrealkv` `< 1.2.0` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0452` / `GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93`)
- crates.io `azure_security_keyvault_certificates` (`0.9.0`..`1.0.0`, `1.1.0-beta.1`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0437`), `azure_security_keyvault_secrets` (`0.10.0`..`1.0.0`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0438`), `azure_security_keyvault_keys` (`0.10.0`..`1.0.0`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0439`), `vodozemac` `<= 0.11.1` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0445`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0451`), and `ocipkg` `<= 0.4.0` (`RUSTSEC-2026-0450`, `RUSTSEC-2026-0449`)
- Go modules `github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go` `< v1.2.1` (`CVE-2026-123272`, CVSS 8.0 High) and `github.com/diillson/chatcli` `< v1.215.2` (`CVE-2026-123271`, CVSS 8.0 High)
- PyPI `ag2` `>= 0.13.2, < 1.1.1` and `autogen` `>= 0.13.2, <= 0.14.1` (`CVE-2026-113663` / `GHSA-2h4w-29cv-2cmv`, CVSS 8.8 High), `banks` `<= 2.4.2` (`CVE-2026-61536` / `GHSA-64vx-6h2c-rjh7`, CVSS 7.5 High), and `mistral-vibe` `< 3.0.3` (`CVE-2026-122133`, `CVE-2026-122134`, `CVE-2026-122135`, all CVSS 8.8 High)
TL;DR
Between 4 and 6 November 2026, the RustSec Advisory Database, NVD, and GitHub Security Advisories published 18 vulnerabilities across Rust web/database/cryptography crates and Go/Python AI agent frameworks:
- Actix Web
4.18.2,actix-http3.20.3, andactix-files0.7.4(RUSTSEC-2026-0443,0446,0447,0448, and0455):- 850-byte large-window Brotli request allocates 1 GiB before handler auth or size limits (
RUSTSEC-2026-0455/GHSA-7p9w-p5qm-5gc5): Because Actix Web enablescompress-brotliby default andactix-httpaccepted the non-standard large-window Brotli format while body extractors (Bytes,String,Json,Form) did not pass their size limits down toencoding::Decoder(RUSTSEC-2026-0447/0448), a single 850-byteContent-Encoding: brrequest grew the decoder’s internal ring buffer to ~1 GiB before any route handler or extractor limit ran. - HTTP/1 chunked trailer request smuggling (
RUSTSEC-2026-0446/GHSA-2q7f-mf9f-5qhr) and Windows 8.3 short-name.env/.gitdisclosure (RUSTSEC-2026-0443/GHSA-8hcm-m7r7-frwc): Inactix-http < 3.20.2, the HTTP/1 chunked decoder accepted a bareLFafter the terminating0chunk as the start of trailer headers, allowing pipelined request smuggling behind proxies that reuse upstream connections. On Windows volumes with 8.3 short names enabled,actix-files < 0.7.4checked only whether path segments started with., allowing clients to download.envor.git/configviaENV~1orGIT~1.
- 850-byte large-window Brotli request allocates 1 GiB before handler auth or size limits (
- SurrealDB
3.3.0(RUSTSEC-2026-0453),surrealdb-core4.0.0(RUSTSEC-2026-0454), andsurrealkv1.2.0(RUSTSEC-2026-0452):surrealkv < 1.2.0guardedInternalKeyRef::from_encodedonly withdebug_assert!(encoded.len() >= 16)(compiled out in release builds), causinglen - 16to underflowusizeand read 8 bytes before the heap buffer on short SSTable keys;surrealdb < 3.3.0erased'poollifetimes viaaffinitypool::spawn_local, causing a use-after-free onTransactionInnermutexes when a future was leaked in safe code; andsurrealdb-core < 4.0.0inherited unsoundunsafe impl Send/Synconreblessive::TreeStack, allowing safe code to racedrive_top_taskacross threads and trigger double frees. - Azure Key Vault Rust SDK
1.0.1(RUSTSEC-2026-0437,0438,0439), Matrixvodozemac0.11.2(RUSTSEC-2026-0445,0451), andocipkg0.4.1(RUSTSEC-2026-0450): Inazure_security_keyvault_{certificates,secrets,keys},KeyVaultAuthorizer::on_challenge()cached the OAuth scope from aWWW-Authenticateheader before verifying that the challenge resource matched the target Key Vault host, so a rejected first request poisoned the client’s cached scope and caused subsequent requests on the same client to mint and send a live Entra ID bearer token for the attacker’s scope. Invodozemac <= 0.11.1, the Matrix Olm root-key ratchet left unzeroized root and chain keys in freed heap memory after each HKDF step. Inocipkg <= 0.4.0,Artifact::unpackderived the extraction path from the archive’s ownindex.jsonorg.opencontainers.image.ref.nameand accepted a hostname of..to write or delete files outside the image store. - AI agent and MCP frameworks (
mark3labs/mcp-goCVE-2026-123272,ChatCLICVE-2026-123271,ag2/autogenCVE-2026-113663,banksCVE-2026-61536, andmistral-vibeCVE-2026-122133..122135): Inmcp-go < v1.2.1(andchatcli < v1.215.2),OAuthHandler.fetchServerMetadata()did not verify that theresourcefield in/.well-known/oauth-protected-resourcebound to the MCP server’s own URL, letting a malicious MCP server request RFC 8707 OAuth tokens scoped to a victim service. Inag2 < 1.1.1(autogen <= 0.14.1),SandboxShellTool(allowed=[...]orreadonly=True) validated only the head command and missed&,\n,\r,<, and write/exec flags on allowed binaries (find . -exec,env,git diff --output=,sort -o) before passing the string tosh -c. Inbanks <= 2.4.2,CompletionExtensionparsedToolJSON from rendered prompt templates and passedTool.import_pathstraight toimportlib.import_module()+getattr()(os.system), bypassing the JinjaSandboxedEnvironmentadded forCVE-2026-44209.
What to do now: Upgrade actix-web to >= 4.18.2, actix-http to >= 3.20.3, actix-files to >= 0.7.4, surrealdb to >= 3.3.0 (surrealdb-core >= 4.0.0, surrealkv >= 1.2.0), azure_security_keyvault_* to >= 1.0.1, vodozemac to >= 0.11.2, mark3labs/mcp-go to >= v1.2.1, ag2 to >= 1.1.1, and mistral-vibe to >= 3.0.3.
Affected packages and crates
| Ecosystem | Package / Crate | Advisory / CVE | Severity | Affected versions | Fixed version | Vulnerable component |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | actix-http, actix-web, actix-files | RUSTSEC-2026-0455, 0448, 0447, 0446, 0443 | High | actix-http < 3.20.3, actix-web < 4.18.2, actix-files < 0.7.4 | actix-http 3.20.3, actix-web 4.18.2, actix-files 0.7.4 | encoding::Decoder (large-window Brotli & extractor limits), HTTP/1 chunked trailer parser, Windows 8.3 short names |
| crates.io | surrealdb, surrealdb-core, surrealkv | RUSTSEC-2026-0453, 0454, 0452 (GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463, GHSA-m9qr-4rcq-3jhc, GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93) | High | surrealdb < 3.3.0, surrealdb-core < 4.0.0, surrealkv < 1.2.0 | 3.3.0, 4.0.0, 1.2.0 | affinitypool::spawn_local UAF, reblessive::TreeStack Send/Sync double free, InternalKeyRef::from_encoded len - 16 underflow |
| crates.io | azure_security_keyvault_{certificates,secrets,keys} | RUSTSEC-2026-0437, 0438, 0439 | High | certificates 0.9.0..1.0.0, 1.1.0-beta.1; secrets & keys 0.10.0..1.0.0 | 1.0.1 (1.1.0-beta.2) | KeyVaultAuthorizer::on_challenge caches WWW-Authenticate scope before verifying resource |
| crates.io | vodozemac, ocipkg | RUSTSEC-2026-0451, 0445, 0450, 0449 | Medium / High | vodozemac <= 0.11.1; ocipkg <= 0.4.0 (archived at 0.4.1) | vodozemac 0.11.2; ocipkg 0.4.1 (migrate to oci-client) | Matrix Olm HKDF root-key ratchet zeroization; Artifact::unpack index.json .. hostname traversal |
| Go | github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go, github.com/diillson/chatcli | CVE-2026-123272, CVE-2026-123271 | CVSS 8.0 High | mcp-go < v1.2.1; chatcli < v1.215.2 | mcp-go v1.2.1; chatcli v1.215.2 | OAuthHandler.fetchServerMetadata() in client/transport/oauth.go |
| PyPI | ag2, autogen | CVE-2026-113663 (GHSA-2h4w-29cv-2cmv) | CVSS 8.8 High | ag2 >= 0.13.2, < 1.1.1; autogen >= 0.13.2, <= 0.14.1 | ag2 1.1.1 | ShellAdapter and READONLY_COMMANDS in ag2/tools/sandbox/filter.py |
| PyPI | banks | CVE-2026-61536 (GHSA-64vx-6h2c-rjh7) | CVSS 7.5 High | <= 2.4.2 | Restrict untrusted {% completion %} templates | src/banks/extensions/completion.py (importlib.import_module on Tool.import_path) |
| PyPI | mistral-vibe | CVE-2026-122133, CVE-2026-122134, CVE-2026-122135 | CVSS 8.8 High (all three) | < 2.25.5 (122133), < 2.25.7 (122134), < 3.0.3 (122135) | 3.0.3 | vibe/core/system_prompt.py (git.exe search path, Git filter drivers, and repo gpg.program RCE) |
Technical analysis
1. Actix Web 4.18.2 & actix-http 3.20.3 (RUSTSEC-2026-0446..0455) and SurrealDB (RUSTSEC-2026-0452..0454)
In Actix Web, request body decompression happens inside actix-http’s encoding::Decoder middleware/stream layer before route handlers or body extractors (web::Json, web::Bytes, web::Form) run. Two independent bugs in actix-http turned default Content-Encoding support into a pre-authentication memory amplifier and request smuggler:
- Large-window Brotli 1 GiB allocation (
RUSTSEC-2026-0455, commit61c6a15c1c) and pre-limit decompression (RUSTSEC-2026-0447/0448, commit41b54d23ea): The Brotli decoder inactix-http < 3.20.3accepted large-window Brotli streams, allowing an 850-byte request withContent-Encoding: brto allocate a ~1 GiB internal ring buffer before yielding enough decompressed output to trip an extractor’s payload limit. Upgrading toactix-http 3.20.3andactix-web 4.18.2disables large-window Brotli and plumbs extractor byte limits directly intoDecoder::limit(). - Chunked trailer bare-LF smuggling (
RUSTSEC-2026-0446, commitfeed12e9ec): After the final0\r\nchunk,actix-http < 3.20.2accepted a bare\nas the start of trailer headers instead of rejecting the malformed framing, allowing an attacker behind a connection-reusing proxy to swallow the next pipelined request’s headers as trailers and treat its body as a new request.
In SurrealDB’s storage engine surrealkv (< 1.2.0, RUSTSEC-2026-0452, commit ac642f945d), InternalKeyRef::from_encoded(encoded: &[u8]) is a safe function that checked debug_assert!(encoded.len() >= 16). In release builds, debug_assert! disappears, and seq_num() / trailer() pass len - 16 into read_u64_be(), which computes buffer.as_ptr().add(offset) and performs an unaligned 8-byte load, wrapping usize below the allocation and reading 8 bytes of heap memory before the buffer whenever an SSTable block contains an internal key shorter than 16 bytes.
2. mark3labs/mcp-go v1.2.1 (CVE-2026-123272) and ChatCLI v1.215.2 (CVE-2026-123271): RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata OAuth token hijacking
When an MCP client connects to an OAuth-protected MCP server, it fetches the server’s RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata (PRM) document (either from a WWW-Authenticate header URL or from /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource<path>) and passes the document’s resource field as the RFC 8707 resource indicator when requesting an access token from the Authorization Server.
In mark3labs/mcp-go prior to v1.2.1 (commit 90d247ed8d), OAuthHandler.fetchServerMetadata() enforced RFC 9728 Section 3.3 resource binding only when the metadata URL was advertised via WWW-Authenticate (if explicitMetadataURL), assuming that the well-known path was safe because its URL was constructed from baseURL:
--- a/client/transport/oauth.go
+++ b/client/transport/oauth.go
@@ -809,6 +817,11 @@ func (h *OAuthHandler) fetchServerMetadata(ctx context.Context) (metadataDiscove
protectedResource.Resource, baseURL,
)
}
+ } else if protectedResource.Resource != "" && !resourceBindsToURL(protectedResource.Resource, baseURL) {
+ return metadataDiscoveryResult{}, fmt.Errorf(
+ "protected resource metadata from %q declares resource %q which does not match base URL %q",
+ protectedResourceURL, protectedResource.Resource, baseURL,
+ )
}
Because the JSON body served at /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource is still controlled by the remote MCP server, a malicious MCP server (https://attacker.example/mcp) could return "resource": "https://victim-mcp.example/mcp" in its well-known PRM document. The client then requested an OAuth token scoped to https://victim-mcp.example/mcp and sent that token in Authorization: Bearer ... to https://attacker.example/mcp. The exact same bug affected KeyVaultAuthorizer::on_challenge() in the Azure Rust SDK (RUSTSEC-2026-0437..0439), which cached the scope parameter from an untrusted WWW-Authenticate challenge before checking whether the challenge resource matched the vault’s domain.
3. ag2 1.1.1 (CVE-2026-113663), banks (CVE-2026-61536), and mistral-vibe 3.0.3 (CVE-2026-122133..122135)
ag2(autogen)SandboxShellToolcommand-filter andreadonly=Truebypass (CVE-2026-113663/GHSA-2h4w-29cv-2cmv, commit3cd86726bb73): When developers configuredSandboxShellTool(allowed=[...])orSandboxShellTool(readonly=True),ShellAdapterchecked the first command word against the allowlist and calledcontains_shell_operator()before executing the command string viash -c. Becausecontains_shell_operator()did not block background&,\n,\r, or<(process substitution<(...)), strings such as"git status & curl ... | sh"or"cat file\nid"passed validation and ran the second command. Furthermore,READONLY_COMMANDSincludedfind(find . -exec ...),env(env touch x),sort(sort -o x),file(-C), andgit(--output=). Inag2 1.1.1, restricted mode splits the command intoargv, matches allowlists word-by-word, stripsfind/env/sort/file/gitfromREADONLY_COMMANDS, and executes the checkedargvdirectly without a shell.banksCompletionExtensionimportlib.import_moduleRCE (CVE-2026-61536/GHSA-64vx-6h2c-rjh7): Althoughbanks 2.4.2switched Jinja rendering toSandboxedEnvironmentto fixCVE-2026-44209,src/banks/extensions/completion.pystill parsedToolJSON blocks from the rendered text of{% completion %}blocks and resolvedTool.import_pathviaimportlib.import_module()+getattr(). An attacker controlling prompt template content can declare a tool with"import_path": "os.system"(or"subprocess.getoutput"), whichbanksexecutes as soon as the model emits a matching tool call.mistral-vibe < 3.0.3repository context RCE (CVE-2026-122133,CVE-2026-122134,CVE-2026-122135): Whenmistral-vibeopens a directory to build its system prompt (vibe/core/system_prompt.py), it runsgitcommands inside the repository. Prior to2.25.5, Windows builds searched the current working directory first (git.exein repo root,CVE-2026-122133); prior to2.25.7,git statusexecuted repository-configured.git/configcleanandprocessfilter drivers (CVE-2026-122134); and prior to3.0.3, project context collection honored a repository-configuredgpg.programbinary (CVE-2026-122135).
Detection and remediation
# 1. Audit Rust Cargo.lock files for vulnerable actix, surrealdb, azure_security_keyvault, vodozemac, and ocipkg versions
cargo audit 2>/dev/null || rg -n -A 2 'name = "(actix-http|actix-web|actix-files|surrealdb|surrealdb-core|surrealkv|azure_security_keyvault_(certificates|secrets|keys)|vodozemac|ocipkg)"' Cargo.lock 2>/dev/null
# 2. Check Go modules for mark3labs/mcp-go and chatcli
rg -n 'mark3labs/mcp-go|diillson/chatcli' go.mod go.sum 2>/dev/null
# 3. Check Python environments and lockfiles for ag2, autogen, banks, and mistral-vibe
pip show ag2 autogen pyautogen banks mistral-vibe 2>/dev/null || true
rg -n '"?(ag2|autogen|pyautogen|banks|mistral-vibe)"?\s*([~=!<>]=|:)' requirements*.txt pyproject.toml uv.lock poetry.lock 2>/dev/null
- Upgrade Rust crates in
Cargo.toml/Cargo.lock:- Upgrade
actix-httpto>= 3.20.3,actix-webto>= 4.18.2, andactix-filesto>= 0.7.4(or stripContent-Encoding: brat your reverse proxy until patched). - Upgrade
surrealdbto>= 3.3.0,surrealdb-coreto>= 4.0.0, andsurrealkvto>= 1.2.0. - Upgrade
azure_security_keyvault_certificates,azure_security_keyvault_secrets, andazure_security_keyvault_keysto>= 1.0.1, andvodozemacto>= 0.11.2. Replace unmaintainedocipkg(0.4.1) withoci-client.
- Upgrade
- Upgrade Go and Python AI/MCP packages:
- Upgrade
github.com/mark3labs/mcp-goto>= v1.2.1andgithub.com/diillson/chatclito>= v1.215.2. - Upgrade
ag2to>= 1.1.1(and migrate offautogen <= 0.14.1), upgrademistral-vibeto>= 3.0.3, and never pass user-controlled prompt templates containing{% completion %}blocks tobanks.
- Upgrade
Timeline
- 2026-10-30 to 2026-11-03: SurrealDB commits fixes for
surrealkv(ac642f945d,1.2.0) andsurrealdb-core(75407c4bcc,4.0.0);ocipkgreleases0.4.1and archives the repository. - 2026-11-04 (
20:20to22:33 UTC): RustSec publishesRUSTSEC-2026-0437,0438, and0439for the Azure Key Vault Rust SDK; NVD publishesCVE-2026-122133,CVE-2026-122134, andCVE-2026-122135for Mistral Vibe3.0.3. - 2026-11-05 (
17:51to23:16 UTC): GitHub Advisory Database and NVD publishGHSA-64vx-6h2c-rjh7(CVE-2026-61536) forbanks,CVE-2026-123272formark3labs/mcp-go v1.2.1,CVE-2026-123271forChatCLI v1.215.2, andGHSA-2h4w-29cv-2cmv(CVE-2026-113663) forag2 v1.1.1. - 2026-11-06 (
12:43to15:30 UTC): RustSec assignsRUSTSEC-2026-0443throughRUSTSEC-2026-0455foractix-files,actix-http,actix-web,vodozemac,ocipkg,surrealkv,surrealdb, andsurrealdb-core.
From research to remediation
Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase
Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.
References
- Actix Web commits 61c6a15c1c (RUSTSEC-2026-0455), feed12e9ec (RUSTSEC-2026-0446), 41b54d23ea (RUSTSEC-2026-0448), 0d0be61bd7 (RUSTSEC-2026-0447), and f2c83122d2 (RUSTSEC-2026-0443)
- SurrealDB advisories GHSA-m9qr-4rcq-3jhc (RUSTSEC-2026-0454), GHSA-pm86-cc75-q463 (RUSTSEC-2026-0453), and GHSA-9fm9-c4h4-8g93 (RUSTSEC-2026-0452)
- Azure SDK for Rust PR #5121 (RUSTSEC-2026-0437, 0438, 0439) and Matrix vodozemac PR #446 (RUSTSEC-2026-0451)
- mark3labs/mcp-go commit 90d247ed8d45cbb7d71d9a95e112789b78760443 (PR #1053, CVE-2026-123272: RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata binding)
- ag2ai/ag2 commit 3cd86726bb731eb11d6270f0ef9e50e42b5abb39 (GHSA-2h4w-29cv-2cmv / CVE-2026-113663) and banks Advisory GHSA-64vx-6h2c-rjh7 (CVE-2026-61536)