MEDIUM 5.3 PyPI

NLTK: Uncontrolled recursion in semantic-logic type parser causes denial of service via nested type strings

GHSA-w3pv-xfw4-ghr7 · CVE-2026-129226

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Description

Root Cause

The semantic-logic type parser read_type (nltk/sem/logic.py:866) recurses on both
halves of every <a,b> complex type (nltk/sem/logic.py:882-884) with no depth or length
bound — only an isinstance assertion and a parenthesis-balance assertion. The
LogicParser.MAX_PARSE_DEPTH guard (nltk/sem/logic.py:107,294) protects the expression
parser but never runs on the read_type path, which is reached directly by the public
Type.fromstring classmethod and by signature-string type checking.

Impact

An application that parses an untrusted type string, or type-checks an expression against
an attacker-influenced signature, aborts with an unhandled RecursionError, terminating
the affected operation or request worker (denial of service, CWE-674). The recursion is
pure Python, yielding a catchable RecursionError rather than memory corruption or code
execution. Confidentiality and integrity are unaffected. Exposure is narrower than a
general-purpose parser because the input must reach a type-string or signature parameter.

Attack Chain

  1. The application calls nltk.sem.logic.Type.fromstring(s) (nltk/sem/logic.py:736) — or
    Expression.typecheck(signature) / Expression.fromstring(expr, type_check=True, signature=...), which reach read_type for each type-string signature value
    (nltk/sem/logic.py:1080) — with a deeply nested type string such as
    "<" * n + "e,e" + ">" * n.
  2. Type.fromstring passes the string straight to read_type with no length or depth
    check (only assertions on type and parenthesis balance).
  3. read_type recurses on both halves of each <a,b> level, consuming one stack frame per
    nesting level; the MAX_PARSE_DEPTH guard on the separate LogicParser class does not
    execute here.
  4. Once the depth exceeds the interpreter recursion limit, an unhandled RecursionError
    propagates out of the public API.

Bypass Evidence

Running the shipped read_type/ComplexType/Type source verbatim at the default
recursion limit: depth 5 parses cleanly to a ComplexType (both assertions satisfied at
every level), while depth 5000 raises an unhandled RecursionError. The clean shallow
parse shows the failure is depth-driven rather than an assertion failure. A code review
confirms the MAX_PARSE_DEPTH bound lives on the LogicParser class and is not applied to
read_type, whose own module docstring for that guard explicitly names uncontrolled
recursion (CWE-674) as the risk it addresses.

Suggested Fix

Apply a recursion-depth bound to read_type (a depth argument raising a bounded
ValueError past a configurable maximum), matching the intent of the existing
LogicParser.MAX_PARSE_DEPTH guard so that both the expression and type-string paths are
protected.

Reported by pi (GitHub: @manus-pi).

Fix status (2026-09-28)

Status: MERGED on develop (unreleased; v3.10.3 of 2026-08-12 predates the fix).

PR: #3885 "Bound recursion depth in parsers and traversal helpers" (ekaf), merged 2026-09-11, merge commit e521ecafc on develop.

Fix commit: 2f4f0d47e (nltk/sem/logic.py: read_type is bounded by LogicParser.MAX_PARSE_DEPTH) with a8036c5e7 (fixes a NameError in that bound).

Probe: nltk/test/unit/security_probes/ghsa_w3pv_xfw4_ghr7.py (added in 2a6704952 on that PR); verdict on develop 2fa3f48fe: FIXED (bounded (LogicalExpressionException)).

Release: none yet; no release tag contains e521ecafc.

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