HIGH 7.3 PyPI

NLTK: Untrusted search path in prover9/mace4 config allows local code execution via relative binary_location

GHSA-cc5r-64rf-75hg · CVE-2026-129234

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Description

Summary

Prover9Parent.config_prover9(binary_location=...) (and Mace, which inherits it) accepts a relative binary_location and passes it as path_to_bin to find_binary, which disables the CWD-relative rejection guard. Unlike the boxer/senna/malt/repp siblings, prover9/mace apply no os.path.isabs() filter, so the resolved relative program path (e.g. ./prover9) is executed from the current working directory via subprocess.Popen. A local attacker who can plant ./prover9 (or ./mace4) in the resolved directory achieves local code execution.

Root Cause

nltk/inference/prover9.py:121-135 calls find_binary(name, path_to_bin=binary_location, env_vars=["PROVER9"], ...). A truthy path_to_bin sets searching_bare_name = not path_to_bin and ... → False (internals.py:935), so the guard if searching_bare_name and not os.path.isabs(path): continue (internals.py:940) never runs. The result is stored in self._prover9_bin; on the next prove(), _call → subprocess.Popen([binary]+args, ...) (prover9.py:207) execs it. Mace(Prover9Parent) inherits config_prover9 (mace.py:229). By contrast boxer's _find_binary (sem/boxer.py:251-266) iterates find_binary_iter and returns only the first os.path.isabs() result; repp/malt/senna similarly reject a relative explicit bin dir. prover9/mace have no such filter.

Impact

Local arbitrary code execution: an attacker-planted ./prover9/./mace4 runs as the invoking user when the application is configured with a relative binary_location and the attacker can write to the resolved directory.

Proof of Concept

In a directory containing an executable ./prover9:

from nltk.inference.prover9 import Prover9
p = Prover9(); p.config_prover9(binary_location='.')
# p._prover9_bin == './prover9'; subsequent prove() Popens it from CWD

Runtime-confirmed: find_binary('prover9', path_to_bin='.') → './prover9'; bare find_binary('prover9') and relative PROVER9='.' via default _find_binary both raise LookupError (the default path is protected).

Attack Chain

  1. Entry: app calls config_prover9(binary_location=<relative>) / config_mace(...). Guard: CWD-rejection in find_binary_iter. Bypass proof: truthy path_to_bin sets searching_bare_name=False → filter never runs.
  2. Resolution: find_binary returns './prover9'. Guard: boxer's if os.path.isabs(binary): return. Bypass proof: prover9/mace have no such loop — relative first match stored verbatim.
  3. Sink: subprocess.Popen(['./prover9']+args) (prover9.py:207) — separator-containing path ⇒ execvp runs it relative to CWD, bypassing $PATH.
  4. Impact: planted ./prover9/./mace4 executes = local code execution.

Bypass Evidence

Runtime: find_binary('prover9', path_to_bin='.') -> './prover9'; find_binary('prover9') -> LookupError. git log -- nltk/inference/prover9.py nltk/inference/mace.py shows only copyright/formatting commits — no security fix. GHSA-6hwm-xvph-95vm (CWE-426/427) is scoped to the dot binary and names the swept class as senna/weka/boxer/malt/repp/hunpos — prover9/mace absent.

Affected Versions

<= 3.10.3 — present on latest release and HEAD; no fix.

Suggested Fix

Mirror boxer: accept only the first os.path.isabs() result from find_binary_iter, or reject a relative binary_location in config_prover9/config_mace.


Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Fix status (2026-09-28)

Status: IN PROGRESS (fix on an open pull request, not yet on develop).

PR: #3887 "Resolve every executed tool binary absolute-only: prover9/mace4, megam, tadm, java, hunpos (untrusted search path, CWE-426/427)", open; head 3ac1c5641 at the time of this note (a develop merge on top of 16b1de8ee, the head on which the verdicts below were measured).

Fix commits: f0a75c665 (a relative binary_location is rejected in prover9/mace, megam and tadm), 4ca190b74 (find_binary_absolute refuses a match containing '..'; config_java, hunpos and the prover9 helpers resolve absolute-only), 992884a02 (the JVM is resolved before spawning and spawned through spawn_trusted), d4f0309bb (own PATH walk without which, pathsec-gated tool locations, a pre-commit hook that keeps every spawn on pathsec).

Probe: nltk/test/unit/security_probes/ghsa_cc5r_64rf_75hg.py (on the PR). Verdict on the PR head: FIXED (213 relative locations refused across 9 entry points; with an install configured every form resolved to it and never to a CWD decoy; a PATH climbing into the decoy directory was refused; a world-writable install was refused at launch). The same probe run against develop 2fa3f48fe: VULNERABLE (config_prover9('./') took the CWD-relative binary ./prover9).

Release: none.

Maintainer reply (2026-09-28)

Status: fixed on develop, unreleased.

Fix: PR #3887 "Resolve every executed tool binary absolute-only: prover9/mace4, megam, tadm, java, hunpos (untrusted search path, CWE-426/427)", merged 2026-09-28 as merge commit 0ebe329cee693e7f84cb5d477b7a3638066194c8 on develop (PR head 3ac1c5641). Fix commits: f0a75c665 (a relative binary_location is refused in prover9/mace, megam and tadm), 4ca190b74 (find_binary_absolute refuses any match with a '..' component; config_java, hunpos and the prover9 helpers resolve absolute-only), 992884a02 (the JVM is resolved before spawning and spawned through spawn_trusted), d4f0309bb (own PATH walk without shelling out to which, pathsec-gated tool locations, and a pre-commit hook that keeps every subprocess spawn in nltk on the pathsec chokepoint). Prover9Parent.config_prover9 and Mace now resolve through nltk.internals.find_binary_absolute, which returns only an absolute candidate with no '..' component, so a relative binary_location can never select a file under the current working directory; the spawn itself goes through nltk.pathsec.spawn_trusted, which refuses a relative or untrusted executable even if one were handed to it directly.

Verification on develop 0ebe329ce with env -u PYTHONPATH /usr/local/bin/python3.13 (CPython 3.13.7, macOS). The proof of concept was run literally: an executable ./prover9 and ./mace4 planted in the working directory, each writing a marker file when run, PROVER9 unset, PATH pointing at an empty directory. Prover9().config_prover9('.') and Mace().config_prover9('.') both raise LookupError ("NLTK found 'prover9' only in the current working directory, which is not a trusted location for executables"), the later prove() and build_model() calls raise LookupError as well, and the marker file is never written. The reporter's bypass primitive find_binary('prover9', path_to_bin='.') now raises LookupError. Every relative form was tried at config time ('.', './', 'sub', './sub', './prover9', ''), through the PROVER9 variable ('.'), and through PATH entries ('.', '', 'sub', './sub'); all refused. With an absolute install configured through PROVER9, every one of those forms resolves to the install and never to the planted decoy. The regression probe nltk/test/unit/security_probes/ghsa_cc5r_64rf_75hg.py reports FIXED on develop (213 relative locations refused across 9 entry points; a PATH entry climbing into the decoy directory refused; a world-writable install refused at launch); the same probe reported VULNERABLE on develop 2fa3f48fe before the merge. nltk/test/unit/test_tool_search_path_security.py: 93 passed, 1 skipped, including the literal end-to-end proof of concept for Prover9 and Mace.

Severity reassessment. Reviewed and kept at High. CVSS 3.1 vector CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, base score 7.3, unchanged from the report. Reasoning: the planted binary has to be on the local filesystem (AV:L); the vulnerability needs the application to be configured with a relative binary_location, and the CVSS 3.1 user guide (section 2.3.3) says a configuration-dependent vulnerability is scored assuming that configuration, so attack complexity stays Low (AC:L); the attacker needs write access to the resolved directory, a low-privileged local account (PR:L); the victim has to run the prover or model builder with that configuration (UI:R); the effect stays within the process (S:U); the planted binary runs as the invoking user (C:H, I:H, A:H). This matches how CWE-426 untrusted search path issues are scored in the NVD (7.3 with UI:R, 7.8 with UI:N) and sits at the same level as the sibling Graphviz dot advisory in this repository.

Release status. Not yet released; no tag contains 0ebe329ce. The latest release v3.10.3 (2026-08-12) predates the fix. The fix will ship in the next release.

Closing this advisory as fixed on develop.

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