UNKNOWN NuGet

Refitter allows arbitrary code execution through unescaped OpenAPI content-type values

GHSA-p32v-8v8j-j534 · CVE-2026-63344

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Description

Summary

Refitter emits the spec's content-type key (content map key in requestBody/responses) verbatim into a Refit [Headers("Accept: <ct>", "Content-Type: <ct>")] attribute string without escaping
". A crafted value survives Refitter's default OpenAPI validation, breaks out of the attribute and
the enclosing interface + namespace, injects a top-level file class with a [ModuleInitializer]
method, and reopens so the file stays valid. .NET runs [ModuleInitializer] methods at assembly
load, so the attacker's code executes at application startup. Verified on Refitter 2.0.0 / .NET 8.

The malicious input is a content-type KEY such as: content: { 'application/': {schema} }.
No --skip-validation is required.

PoC

reproduce.sh (+ make_spec.py) attached: generates with default validation, compiles into a
console app, runs it (Main does not touch the client), and shows a marker written at assembly load.

Impact

Code execution at assembly load (process startup) in any application that compiles a Refitter client
generated from an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description. Estimated Critical, e.g.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (the CNA sets the final score).

Suggested fix

Escape every spec-derived string before emitting it into a Refit attribute (escape ", \,
reject newlines) and validate characters. We recommend auditing all attribute emissions that embed
spec-derived values, using one shared encoder.
reproduce.sh
maintainer-report.txt
make_spec.py

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