UNKNOWN NuGet

Refitter allows arbitrary code execution through unescaped OpenAPI paths

GHSA-3fhm-p725-h3g3 · CVE-2026-63345

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Description

Summary

Refitter emits each OpenAPI path (the paths-object key) verbatim into a Refit [Get("<path>")]
attribute string, without escaping " or restricting characters. A crafted single-line, /-prefixed
path survives Refitter's default OpenAPI validation yet closes the attribute string and the enclosing
interface + namespace, injects a top-level file class with a [ModuleInitializer] method, and
reopens a namespace + interface so the file stays valid. .NET runs [ModuleInitializer] methods when
the generated assembly is loaded, so the attacker's code executes at application startup. Verified on
Refitter 2.0.0 / .NET 8.

Details

[Get("/p")] Task<string> Dummy(); } }
file class Evil { [System.Runtime.CompilerServices.ModuleInitializer]
  internal static void Init(){ /* attacker code */ } }
namespace N2 { public partial interface I2 { [Get("/q")]
        Task<string> GetU(string id);
    }
}

No --skip-validation is needed (the payload is a valid single-line path). The generated .cs is
compiled into the victim application; the module initializer runs at assembly load. This is distinct
from the value sinks (enum/default), which are escaped; the path sink has no escaping. The
[Header("<name>")] attribute is likewise emitted raw (header parameter names), at minimum a
build-breaking DoS.

PoC

reproduce.sh (+ make_spec.py) attached: generates with default validation, compiles into a console
app, runs it (Main does not touch the client), and shows a marker written at assembly load. Verified
on 2.0.0.

Impact

Code execution at assembly load (process startup) in any application that compiles a Refitter client
generated from an attacker-controlled or attacker-influenced OpenAPI description.

Suggested fix

Escape the route template before emitting it into [Get("…")] (escape ", \, reject newlines) and
validate that paths contain only legal URI-template characters. Apply the same encoding to
[Header(…)], [Post/Put/Delete(…)], and every attribute that embeds a spec-derived string.
maintainer-report.txt
make_spec.py
reproduce.sh

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