Steeltoe: OAEP setting silently selects PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
GHSA-4j9m-h44m-2hv8 · CVE-2026-50268
Published · Modified
Description
Summary
Configuring encrypt:rsa:algorithm=OAEP does not enable OAEP encryption. Due to an incorrect BouncyCastle transformation string, the OAEP setting selects PKCS#1 v1.5, which is the same algorithm as the DEFAULT setting.
Impact
Operators who configure encrypt:rsa:algorithm=OAEP to obtain CCA2-secure padding receive PKCS#1 v1.5 instead. Currently, Decrypt() is called only against operator-controlled configuration data, so no exploitable path exists, but any future code path that exposes a decryption oracle would be Bleichenbacher-vulnerable despite the OAEP setting.
Migration note
Existing {cipher} values produced under the broken OAEP setting were encrypted with PKCS#1 v1.5. The fix makes OAEP use actual OAEP padding, so those values will fail to decrypt after upgrading. Re-encrypt all affected {cipher} values after upgrading.
References
- WEB https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/security-advisories/security/advisories/GHSA-4j9m-h44m-2hv8
- ADVISORY https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50268
- WEB https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/Steeltoe/commit/6cfee5cccddf8f9a31de69b0ca5ccdd771b73e5b
- PACKAGE https://github.com/SteeltoeOSS/security-advisories
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