critical

CVE

CVE-2026-53998, CVE-2026-129448, CVE-2026-124680, CVE-2026-129349

CWE

CWE-506, CWE-522, CWE-200, CWE-94, CWE-668, CWE-269, CWE-829, CWE-284

Affected Surface

  • GitHub repositories, CI runners, and linked AWS or Azure identities exposed to the WFX Phantom (`wfx-loot`) campaign between 10 and 12 November 2026
  • Railway workspaces and linked accounts whose secrets were stored on the platform before the October 2026 build-platform breach Railway disclosed on 10 November
  • Optimizely Web Experimentation snippets that served attacker-modified Project JavaScript on 16 November 2026

Welcome to Corgea’s weekly briefing. The briefing covers the most important security findings and research from the week.

This edition covers research published from Wednesday, 11 November through Tuesday, 17 November 2026, following the prior 10 November briefing. Several posts in that date window had already been surfaced from earlier Tuesday editions, so this roundup sticks to the 24 research articles that had not yet appeared in a weekly briefing.

Top Article

WFX Phantom (wfx-loot) GitHub Actions secret stealer hits 8,093 repositories and leaks into Packagist neuronai-studio and Go modules (gocurl, redock)

Aikido Security gave this campaign its first clear public name, while StepSecurity, SafeDep, and OX Security filled in the tradecraft and the scale. It leads the week because it did far more than poison one package or one maintainer account. The operator used 4,837 compromised GitHub accounts to probe more than 63,000 repositories, planted a CI secret stealer in 8,093 of them, scraped Runner.Worker memory, pivoted into AWS and Azure through OIDC, and then deleted its own workflow runs to hide the trail. If your team still treats short-lived runners or OIDC federation as a strong enough boundary on their own, this is the article to read first.

Keep it next to Railway’s build breach, the WPPConnect trusted-publishing compromise, Go, Git, Gotenberg, OpenObserve, and cap-primitives, and node-opcua, sqlparse, compose-lint, Rack, Dagu, fast-agent-mcp, and 7-Zip. Different stacks, same lesson: build and automation paths now hold the keys to cloud accounts, package releases, and production secrets.

More news

Railway’s build breach: a partial isolation escape, a Temporal client that trusted a push credential, and an OIDC binding that led to decrypted customer variables for up to 100,000 workspaces

Railway deserves credit for publishing the incident report in useful detail, and StepSecurity plus Wiz helped frame why the chain matters beyond one vendor. This story stays near the top because it showed how three ordinary engineering shortcuts can stack into a platform-wide secret exposure: shared build hosts, a workflow engine that stores secrets in history, and an OIDC trust policy that was too broad. At the high end the blast radius reached about 100,000 workspaces, 1,852 decrypted linked-account tokens, and about $740,000 in fraudulent AI spend.

Pair it with Arize Phoenix’s unauthenticated applyChatTemplate secret disclosure, Apache APISIX’s auth-bypass set, React Server Components, Mongoose, and Directus, and Xen Orchestra plus the week’s KEV additions. All four are reminders that “internal” control planes stop being internal once an attacker can reach the trust boundary.

OPTIMJACK: attackers wrote a card skimmer and crypto clipper into the Optimizely Web snippets of 178 organizations

Scott Helme of Report URI deserves the first public credit for sizing the incident, while StepSecurity and Cynet filled in the payload behavior and Optimizely handled disclosure and cleanup. It ranks this high because the attacker turned a single vendor trust path into malware delivery across 178 organizations, then used the injected script to swap crypto wallets, skim payment cards, steal cookies, and route older iOS devices toward exploit-kit infrastructure.

Read it alongside Apache Roller’s actively exploited XML-RPC deserialization bug, NoisyTCP’s remote Linux crash path, LibreOffice’s spreadsheet-to-RCE chain, and FrankenPHP, OpenMage, Rucio, and safemode. Each one turns a feature or integration people stop thinking about into an attack path that gets ugly fast.

Other news:

From research to remediation

Check whether this pattern exists in your codebase

Turn this research into a remediation workflow. Scan dependencies and package manifests for similar supply-chain risk, then prioritize fixes with reachability context.

References